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COMMENTS
THE ILLUSORY TRUST AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY:
A NEW TWIST TO AN OLD TALE
by W. Richard Jones
It has long been considered desirable, as a matter of policy, to provide
a surviving spouse with an interest in the property of a deceased mate.
Thus in early common law the concepts of dower and curtsey were de-
veloped to provide for the survivor of the marital partnership.1 More re-
cently, many common law jurisdictions have substituted for these rights
a statutory share, which is usually a percentage of the decedent's property
or an allowance for a period of years.' This statutory claim is in the na-
ture of an expectancy. There is no limitation on the owner's ability to deal
as he wishes with his property during his lifetime-he can barter, sell, or
give it away. Only at death does the survivor's property interest become
sufficiently mature to be asserted, and ownership must be measured at that
time.'
I. ILLUSORY TRUST DOCTRINE
Since the surviving spouse's statutory share is usually a percentage of
the assets owned by the other spouse at death, this share may be severely
reduced in amount by any device which removes property from the de-
cedent's estate. One such device, and clearly the most popular, is the trust.
By its probate-avoidance characteristics a trust provides a potential means
of reducing the surviving spouse's statutory share, and yet can be drafted
so that the settlor retains all of the incidents of ownership over the prop-
erty during his lifetime. The problem presented was vividly portrayed
by Judge Kephart of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
1 In England the concept of dower, which may be described as essentially a right of the widow
to a share (normally one-third) of all realty of which the husband was seized, either at the time of
marriage or during marriage, was customary until given a statutory basis in the 1217 addition to
the Magna Carta. The concept was abolished by the Administration of Estates Act of 1925, 15
Geo. 5. c. 23. Perhaps the best description can be found in 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 404 (2d ed. 1923).
'The statutes are collected in 6 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 970 (1958).
'Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966, 968-69 (1937) declares: "Since the law gives
the wife only an expectant interest in the property of her husband which becomes part of his estate,
and since the law does not restrict transfers of property by the husband during his life .... "
In other common-law jurisdictions the rule is the same, except that in some the limitation even
of the doctrine of illusory trusts is not available: Cherniak v. Home Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 151
Conn. 367, 198 A.2d 58, 59 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1964), "either spouse may, in his lifetime, without
the consent or knowledge of the other, make a valid gift, or otherwise dispose of his property, to
a third party." Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299, 306 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1945),
"In this Commonwealth a husband has an absolute right to dispose of any or all of his personal
property in his lifetime, without the knowledge or consent of his wife. ... Wright v. Holmes,
100 Me. 508, 62 A. 507, 510 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1905), "the law places no restriction or limitation on
the power of the husband to make such disposition by gift, voluntary conveyance or otherwise, of
his personal property during his lifetime, as he may wish, even though his wife is thereby deprived
of the distributive share therein .... " Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 A. 64, 70 (1887),
"Nothing is better settled than the power of a husband to dispose of his personal property in good
faith, by gift or otherwise, during coverture .... "
In other common-law jurisdictions, however, the rule is not so well settled. In the decision of
In re Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473, 480 (1964), for example, the court quali-
fied an earlier statement in Balafas v. Balafas, 263 Minn. 267, 117 N.W.2d 20, 26 (1962), as fol-
lows: "there may be circumstances where the transfer to a third party by a spouse will operate as
a fraud on the other so that a court of equity will interfere."
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What the husband did in this case was to transfer to a third party, as trustee,
personal property. He was to receive the entire income and all benefits from
this trust for his life. He had the right to control and manage it in the hands
of the trustee. He could change the beneficiaries even to the day of his death.
He had the right to revoke the trust and retake physical possession at any
time. In other words, his hand never left the property nor its benefits until
his death severed the connection. He placed the property in the name of this
third party solely to prevent his wife from having any share whatever in it
after his death.'
Faced with this problem, many common law jurisdictions have devel-
oped a doctrine to limit such trusts and to prevent their use to avoid the
spouse's statutory share. The doctrine is often described as the illusory trust
doctrine of Newman v. Dore.!
Newman v. Dore was not the first case,' nor even the first New York
case,7 to enunciate the doctrine of illusory trusts; but it has become the
most famous. The case arose when Ferdinand Straus conveyed all of his
property to a trustee, and then died three days later. The trust instrument
reserved to Straus the income for life, the power to revoke the trust, and
the right to control the trustees.! In addition, the express purpose of the
conveyance was to prevent his widow from securing at his death the share
of his estate to which she would be entitled by statute.! In holding the
transaction illusory and an unlawful invasion of the expectant interest of
the wife," the New York court enunciated this test and rationale:
Since the law gives the wife only an expectant interest in the property of
her husband which becomes part of his estate, and since the law does not
restrict transfers of property by the husband during his life, it would seem
that the only sound test of the validity of a challenged transfer is whether
it is real or illusory. . . . The test has been formulated in different ways,
but in most jurisdictions the test applied is essentially the test of whether the
husband has in good faith divested himself of ownership of his property or
has made an illusory transfer. The 'good faith' required of the donor or settlor
in making a valid disposition of his property during life does not refer to
the purpose to affect his wife but to the intent to divest himself of the own-
ership of the property .. .
4 Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 A. 721, 724 (1932) (dissenting
opinion).
5275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
'Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 31 A. 14 (1891) enunciated this test at an early period.
See also cases cited 9 N.E.2d at 969. The decision of Justice Holmes in Leonard v. Leonard, 181
Mass. 458, 63 N.E. 1068 (1902), seems to apply a test of whether the transaction was an agency,
and not to distinguish between the agency doctrine and the marital property illusory concept. See
text accompanying note 16 infra. In the case of Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 62 A. 507, 509
(Sup. Jud. Ct. 1905) the court spoke in terms of "fraudulent" and "colorable," but set out this
test: "where the transfer is a mere device or contrivance by which the husband, retaining to him-
self the use and benefit of the property during his life, and not parting with the absolute dominion
over it, seeks at his death to deprive his widow of her distributive share .... "
7See, e.g., cases cited in Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College, 185 N.Y. 485, 78 N.E. 359,
361 (1906).
' This case might also have been subject to the objection of testamentary character. See text
accompanying note 16 infra.
9N.Y. DEcFo. EsT. LAW § 18 (1930). The same rule may now be found in N.Y. DECED. EST.
LAW § 18(b) (McKinney Supp. 1965), but it has been significantly modified by the addition of
18 (a).
109 N.E.2d at 969.
'Id. at 968-69.
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Newman v. Dore has been followed, approved, cited, distinguished, dis-
avowed, and misunderstood in hundreds of decisions in dozens of juris-
dictions. In fact, in New York alone several variations of the doctrine have
been applied as the doctrine of Newman v. Dore. In addition, the courts
have been less than precise in characterizing this situation." The term
"illusory" is often used interchangeably with "testamentary" and "col-
orable" to explain that a trust is invalid because the settlor has retained too
much control over the property. But these terms are in fact not inter-
changeable. Each should refer to a different rationale and a different test
of invalidity. For example, suppose that the settlor reserves a life estate,
the power to revoke, to modify, to change trustees, to control the actions
of the trustees, to appoint the remainder, and to require invasion of the
principal. Litigants-the trustee, the beneficiaries under a will, or the heirs
at law of the settlor-may contend that the grantor retained so much
control that the trust instrument is nothing more than an agency agree-
ment. Since an agency terminates on the death of the principal, the prop-
erty cannot pass by the purported trust instrument unless that instrument
also happens to comply with the statutory" formalities for wills. 4 Inva-
lidity of this trust is predicated upon the rationale that without conform-
ing to the statute regulating testamentary disposition an agency agree-
ment cannot pass property at death." The purported "trust" is testa-
" For illustration, compare these definitions: "[I]f the transfer is colorable only and the hus-
band retains the power of revocation, it is fallacious, illusive and deceiving, and will be considered
as fraud on the rights of the widow where she is deprived of her distributive share." Ackers v.
First Nat'l Bank, 192 Kan. 319, 387 P.2d 840, 851 (1963), opinion clarified on denial of rehearing,
192 Kan. 471, 389 P.2d 1 (1964). "[Iljlusory, intended only as a mask for the effective retention
by the settlor of the property which in form he had conveyed." Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371,
9 N.E.2d 966, 969 (1937). " 'Colorable' means merely that the conveyance or gift must be one
legally binding on the settlor or donor, accomplished in his lifetime, and not testamentary in its
effect." Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299, 306 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1945). "[I]f the
title vests at or following the death of the settlor the trust is a testamentary trust." Routson v.
Hovis, 60 Ohio App. 536, 22 N.E.2d 209, 210 (1938). "The term 'illusory' . . . is intended to
show that such trusts may not be used as a device to deprive the widow of her distributive share
of the property possessed by her husband at the time of his death." Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.,
144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944).
"See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (1956).
14 There seems to be no valid reason to prevent probate of a trust instrument executed with the
requisite formalities, except possibly the requirement of publication common to many jurisdictions.
See 1 A.W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 5 56.7 (2d ed. 1956), where the author states: "If it
cannot take effect as a disposition inter vivos because it is intended to take effect on death and is
therefore testamentary, it would seem that it should not also fail as a testamentary disposition
merely because the grantor did not think of it as such. ... See also A.W. Scott, Trusts and
the Statute of Wills, 43 HARv. L. REV,. 521, 534 (1930). But even if a testamentary trust is ex-
ecuted with the formalities for a will there may still be extensive problems. Suppose, for example,
that there is another will--one may revoke the other. And a difficult problem of incorporation of
the two will result. Some of the problems are discussed, inferentially, in Flickinger, The Pour Over
Trust and the Wills Statutes: Uneasy Bedfellows, 52 Ky. L.J. 731 (1964).
"Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 57(2) (1935):
Where the settlor transfers property in trust and reserves not only a beneficial life
estate and a power to revoke and modify the trust but also such power to control
the trustee as to the details of the administration of the trust that the trustee is the
agent of the settlor, the disposition so far as it is intended to take effect after his
death is testamentary and is invalid unless the requirements of the statutes relating
to the validity of wills are complied with.
This provision was expressly revoked by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 (1957).
See the criticism which Scott levels at the Restatement view, in 1 A.W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 57.2, at 450 (2d ed. 1956).
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mentary. 16
Suppose, however, that property is conveyed to a trustee by an instru-
ment which on its face appears absolute and irrevocable, completely di-
vesting the settlor of dominion and control. But in fact there is a secret
agreement between the settlor and the trustee, whereby the former actual-
ly retains the ownership of the property. The purpose of this transaction
may be to defeat the claims of creditors, or of the spouse who has a marital
interest in the property. Anyone deprived of his interest may seek a ju-
dicial declaration of invalidity on the grounds that the transaction is
tainted with a fraudulent intent. It is said that the transaction is color-
able."
On the other hand, the invalidity of an illusory trust is not predicated
on any doctrine of agency nor on any argument of fraud. It rests on pub-
lic policy. There is no secret agreement; the retention of power is plain
from the face of the instrument." But the retention of power need not be
so great as to render the trust a mere agency." Therefore, the trust may
be valid as to all the world, complying with all formalities of the trust
statutes. But if the surviving spouse challenges the trust the courts will
set aside the transaction as to the marital interest therein." Since the doc-
trine of illusory trusts is predicated upon the marital property rationale,
it may be asserted only by the widow or widower who has been deprived
of a marital interest.2 Moreover, the doctrine is limited to the extent of
the survivor's interest in the property.2 The remainder of the trust is
8 The word 'testamentary' is the appropriate word to use to describe a person's inter
vivos transaction relating to his property, when the transaction in question operates
to transfer the property to another person only at the transferor's death. In order for
such a transfer to be effective to pass the property to the other person, the trans-
feror must, by the law of wills, execute a written document which fulfills the legal
requirements for a will.
Less precise words, like 'illusory,' 'void,' 'nugatory,' 'invalid,' 'colorable,' etc., are
used sometimes to describe a person's inter vivos transaction when the transaction
is ruled ineffective to accomplish some result intended by him-whether that result
is to pass property at his death (for which, as noted above, 'testamentary' is the more
precise word), whether it is to deprive his surviving spouse of her statutory right
to elect a fractional share of his estate, or whether it is to immunize the transaction
on his death from death taxes or from the claims of creditors ....
A.W. Scott, Jr., The Revocable Trust and the Surviving Spouse's Statutory Share in Colorado, 36
COLO. L. REV. 464 n.1 (1964).
17 This type of transaction is, of course, just one variety of fraud, applicable here because of
the control retained by the settlor. See generally Comment, The Present Status of "Illusory" Trusts,
44 MIcH. L. REV. 151 (1945). See also text accompanying note 60 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 24-40 infra.
'"See text accompanying note 70 infra. The tests for determining whether a trust is testa-
mentary are not the same as those for determining whether a non-trust conveyance is testamentary.
" The Supreme Court of Minnesota has characterized this area of the law very well: "the
troublesome ambivalence found in this area of the law .... " In re Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn.
183, 130 N.E.2d 473 (1964). Because the courts often fail to distinguish between the above
transactions, the term "illusory" is less precise than would be desired. See note 16 supra. But this
term does have a certain definitive meaning in this context, accorded principally by the courts of
New York and by the Texas Supreme Court in a recent case. But, where used herein, it is in-
tended to apply only to the transaction described in this paragraph.
2" Even if it is valid as against his next of kin or residuary legatees, the widow is entitled to
a distributive share of the trust property. A.W. Scott, The Effect of a Power To Revoke a Trust,
57 HARv. L. REV. 362, 370 (1944). See also cases cited note 22 infra; A.W. Scott, Jr., The
Revocable Trust and the Surviving Spouse's Statutory Share in Colorado, 36 COLO. L. REV. 464,
464-65 (1964).
" Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 I11. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944) ("illusory" and
"colorable" as to widow's statutory share); Ackers v. First Nat'l Bank, 192 Kan. 319, 387 P.2d 840
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generally valid unless it falls under the prohibition of some other rule of
invalidity."3
II. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE: A STANDARD
OF CONTROL
The major consideration in the application of both agency and the il-
lusory trust doctrines is the amount of control retained by the settlor of
the trust. Under the agency doctrine the test is whether the settlor parted
with sufficient indicia of ownership so that title actually passed to the trus-
(1963), opinion clarified on denial of rehearing, 192 Kan. 471, 389 P.2d 1 (1964); Bolles v. Toledo
Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381, 391 (1944) ("We are of the opinion that a wife's
right to elect to take under the law places her in a higher position than a mere creditor in respect
of the personal property in an unrevoked revocable trust."); Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437,
72 N.E.2d 378 (1947) (following Bolles); Routson v. Hovis, 60 Ohio App. 536, 22 N.E.2d 209
(1938). Bolles and Harris have been expressly overruled, Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio
St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961) and Routson has thereby been overruled by implication. See note 23
infra.
In those jurisdictions where the doctrine of illusory trusts is recognized there is some problem
with this concept. In Burns v. Turnbull, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945) the New York
Court of Appeals reversed without opinion a decision of the lower court, Burns v. Turnbull, 37
N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1943) which had misapplied the standards of Newman v. Dore. The Court
of appeals declared the entire trust illusory, not just the share of the surviving spouse. Thus it
seems that the New York court was correct in reversing, but misapplied its own doctrine. See 1
A.W. Sco-rr, THE LAW OF TRusTs § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956). See also City Bank Farmers' Trust Co.
v. Charity Organizations Soc'y, 238 App. Div. 720, 265 N.Y.S. 267, aff'd mem., 264 N.Y. 441,
191 N.E. 504 (1934); text accompanying note 71 infra.
23 Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, Ohio, and possibly several other states reject the doc-
trine of illusory trusts altogether. Although the courts in those jurisdictions sometimes describe
trusts as illusory, they are in fact applying the agency concept. The case of Kerwin v. Donaghy,
317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1945) is illustrative. In that decision the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared the rule with respect to conveyances which defeat the
marital share to be: "the conveyance or gift must be one legally binding on the settlor or donor,
accomplished in his lifetime, and not testamentary in its effect." 59 N.E.2d at 306. In Cherniack
v. Home Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 151 Conn. 372, 198 A.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1964), the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut made the distinction clear: "Our decisions are contrary to the
rationale of cases such as Newman v. Dore .... " 198 A.2d at 60.
The situation in Ohio is often cited as representative of both views. Prior to 1961 the doctrine
applied in that state was clearly in line with Newman v. Dore. In Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144
Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381, 390 (1944) the court stated: "It is not necessary to hold that the
terms and administration of either trust . ..created a mere agency to come to the conclusion that
Mr. Bolles during his lifetime had substantial enjoyment and dominion over the [trust property]
.... Therefore, we are led to the conclusion that as to the widow, [the trusts] were illusory."
The court upheld the trust, but allowed the wife to receive therefrom her statutory share. Harris
v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947) followed and clarified the Bolles decision,
dwelling on the control retained by the settlor. In Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St.
489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961), however, the court overruled both of those decisions, stating, "If the
trust was, in reality, 'illusory,' as the court held it to be, then it was not a valid trust, and all of
the property in it should have passed to the settlor's administrator or executor." 179 N.E.2d at 67.
In Smyth the court approved and followed the decisions of Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134
Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E.2d 627 (1938) and Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 Ohio St. 328, 21
N.E.2d 119 (1939). These decisions, however, were concerned with the doctrine of testamentary
transfers, and did not involve a challenge by a surviving spouse. During the period between 1944
and 1961 the decisions of the Bolles line and those of the Cleveland Trust Co. line had existed
together in apparent harmony.
In Pennsylvania the development was almost the reverse of that in Ohio. In the case of Dick-
erson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 A. 64 (1887), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a self-
declaration of trust against the claims of a surviving spouse: "If the bonds and bank stock in
controversy were the subject of valid trusts imposed on them by the testator during his life-time
in favor of his children, and so remained until after his decease, they were not his property in
his own right at the time of his death, in 1884, and hence appellant, claiming as his widow against
the will, has no interest in the securities, or the proceeds thereof." 8 A. at 68. In Beirne v. Conti-
nental-Equitable Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 A. 721 (1932) the court upheld a trust where the
settlor reserved extensive powers. A vehement dissent protested that "by the simple expedient of
a deed of trust a husband may accomplish that which he cannot do by his will, and may deprive
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tee.' On the other hand, a trust is illusory, even if actual title has been
conveyed, when the settlor retains so much power over the property that
as a matter of policy it should be subject to the statutory share of the sur-
viving spouse.' The standards are different because the concepts are un-
related.
The Control Standard. It is still not clear what degree of control by the
settlor will render a trust illusory. The indicia of ownership and control
which can be reserved in a trust are almost endless, and the cumulative
effect varies when different combinations of powers are retained. How-
ever, some guidelines are available.
Reserved powers may be classified under three broad headings for pur-
his wife of any right or claim to his personal property after his death." 161 A. at 723-24. See also
Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Braum, 294 Pa. 482, 144 A. 401 (1928) (actual intent to defraud
widow does not render trust illusory); Benkart v. Trust Co., 269 Pa. 257, 112 A. 62 (1920).
Legislative action changed the rule: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (1947) provides in part:
A conveyance of assets by a person who retains a power of appointment by will,
or a power of revocation or consumption over the principal thereof, shall at the elec-
tion of his surviving spouse, be treated as a testamentary disposition so far as the
surviving spouse is concerned to the extent to which the power has been reserved ....
In a case which arose prior to the enactment of that statute but which was decided thereafter, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the statutory view. In In re Pengelly's Estate, 374 Pa. 358,
97 A.2d 844 (1953) the court declared "a long existing public policy of the Commonwealth to
protect the rights of widows. ... No cases were cited by the court for that proposition. 97
A.2d at 849.
In Minnesota the result is less than clear. Compare Balafas v. Balafas, 263 Minn. 267, 117
N.W.2d 20, 26 (1962) (survivorship agreement between brothers as partners held valid as against
widow) with In re Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964).
The Florida decision of Williams v. Collier, 120 Fla. 248, 158 So. 815, 162 So. 868 (1935)
has been cited as an 'illusory' trust case, but the reasoning of the court does not lend credence to
this idea. So, too, has the Virginia decision of Morris v. Barbour, 188 Va. 723, 51 S.E.2d 334 (Sup.
Ct. App. 1949), but that case involved "a voluntary obligation unsupported by a valuable con-
sideration, payable after the consort's death, and given with the intent to deprive the surviving
spouse of his or her distributive right in the consort's personal estate." 51 S.E.2d at 340. The In-
diana decision of Wheelock v. Wheelock, 97 Ind. App, 501, 187 N.E. 205 (1933) seems to sup-
port the proposition that the trust is invalid only as to the widow's share.
This is the view adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS S 57, comment c (1957).
The rule stated in this section (that retention of control over the trustee does not render a trust
per se illusory) is applicable although the trust is one which could not be created by will:
If the owner of property transfers it inter vivos to another person in trust, the in-
tended trust is not invalid merely because the settlor reserves a beneficial life estate
and a power to revoke or modify the trust, even though he was prohibited by statute
from creating a similar trust by will.
Thus, if it is provided by statute that the wife of a testator shall be entitled to
a certain portion of his estate of which she cannot be deprived by will, a married man
can nevertheless transfer his property inter vivos in trust and his widow will not be
entitled on his death to a share of the property so transferred, even though he re-
serves a life estate and power to revoke or modify the trust. Where, however, an out-
right gift would not operate to deprive the wife of her distributed share, a trust
created under the same circumstances would be equally ineffective.
In addition, a number of jurisdictions embrace a fraud view, which is clearly separate from
either the control doctrine of illusory trusts or the concept of testamentary transfers.
"I1 A.W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 57.2, at 449-50 (2d ed. 1965). In 1939 the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, seemed to equate this with the doctrine of Newman v.
Dore, which it cited for the proposition that "the determining factor as to the validity of the
trust is the intent with which the settlor transferred the property to the trustee. If illusory, there
is no transfer; if made with the intent to transfer the actual title, it is effective." Marine Midland
Trust Co. v. Stanford, 256 App. Div. 26, 9 N.Y.S.2d 648, 651 (1939).
" See the analogous tax doctrine in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2036-38. The analogy is quite
vivid where the tax consequences of revocable trusts are compared. See, e.g., Warren, How To
Avoid Four Major Income Tax Problems of Testamentary Trusts, 24 J. TAXATION 278 (1965);
Weinstock, A Tax Analysis of How To Use the Funded Revocable Trust To Avoid Probate, 26 J.
TAXATION 38 (1967).
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poses of analysis: (1) the power of revocation; (2) the beneficial enjoy-
ment of the property and the power to invade the corpus; and (3) the
power to control the acts of the trustee, to appoint a new trustee, or to
serve as trustee.
The Power of Revocation. A settlor may retain the power to revoke a trust,
in whole or in part; a power to modify some or all of the terms of the
trust; or a combination of these powers. No court has held that retention
by the settlor of the power to revoke the trust in whole or in part, stand-
ing alone, renders the trust illusory."
Beneficial Enjoyment. A settlor may retain a great variety of powers over
the beneficial enjoyment of the trust property. He may possess alone, or in
conjunction with another person, the power to designate or change bene-
ficiaries. He may possess a life interest himself, or the power to invade the
corpus for his benefit. The latter power may be exercisable alone, or in
conjunction with another person, by the settlor in his sole discretion, or
limited by an ascertainable standard. Few cases have determined whether
the reservation of limited powers of beneficial enjoyment, such as a life
estate, will render a trust illusory. In Routson v. Hovis7 the Ohio Court of
Appeals examined a trust in which the reservation was limited to a life
estate. The court held that the trust was non-testamentary, but was illu-
sory as to the wife's statutory rights. This view seems logical, but very
strict; it is clearly a minority view."
More significant powers designed to affect the beneficial enjoyment are
rarely found in isolation. Instead, it is the usual practice for the settlor
who retains significant beneficial enjoyment in addition to a life interest
to retain also the power to revoke, modify, or change the terms of the
trust. The holding of the New York court in MacGregor v. Fox," that
the reservation of the power to revoke plus the power to invade corpus
renders a trust illusory, indicates the probable result where such powers
exist in combination. The decision of In re Pengelly's Estate," where the
Pennsylvania court seemed to confuse illusory and "testamentary" trans-
fers, presents a different view: A trust "is not rendered testamentary in
character because the settlor reserves a beneficial life estate, and in addi-
tion, a power to revoke or modify, in whole or part .... Where, however,
settlor, in addition to the reservations above mentioned, reserves the power
to control the trustee as to the administration of the trust, and thus makes
the trustee merely the agent of the settlor, the scheme becomes testamen-
tary . . . ."" That trust, it should be noted, was challenged by a widow
26 But see 60 MIcH. L. Ruv. 1197, 1200 (1962) (suggesting that every revocable trust might
be illusory). In the Colorado decision of Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953),
there is dicta that a surviving spouse can reach the property if there is a reservation of a power to
revoke, without more. This dicta was disposed of by holding such a trust valid against the widow
in the later case of Richard v. James, 138 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956).
2760 Ohio App. 536, 22 N.E.2d 209 (1938).
28 See note 29 infra, and accompanying text.
29280 App. Div. 435, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1952), aff'd mem., 305 N.Y. 576, 111 N.E.2d 445
(1953).
s0374 Pa. 358, 97 A.2d 844 (1953).
as 97 A.2d at 846.
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who alleged a deprivation of her marital share in the trust property. While
the decision seems to require more than a life estate plus the power to
revoke or to control the trustee in order to render a trust invalid at the
behest of a surviving spouse, that decision is clearly distinguishable. First,
the statement is dicta-facts supporting such a statement were not before
the court. Second, the decision was based on statutory language. Third,
the court was faced with the urgent job of changing its own ruling. 2 Nev-
ertheless, Professor Scott takes the same view."
Power To Control the Trustee. Power to control the trustee, to approve
investments, to require or prevent sale of assets, or other limited powers
over the trustee, are powers which indicate that the settlor is really acting
as owner of the property. In addition, the settlor may act as trustee him-
self, or have the power to remove and appoint trustees at will. Where the
reservation of power to control the trustee, regarding investments, for
example, is the only power retained, it would be antithetical to general
principles of trust law to declare that solely for this reason the trust was
illusory.
It seems clear, however, that even a limited power over the actions of
the trustee will render an express trust illusory when coupled with both
beneficial enjoyment and the power to revoke. In Smith v. Northern Trust
Co., 4 a leading case in point, the Illinois Court of Appeals declared that
the reservation of the power to prevent sale of trust assets, when coupled
with the power to revoke, to alter or amend, and to invade principal, made
a trust illusory and invalid as to the widow." Professor Scott also takes
this view."
These then are the incidents of control which the settlor may reserve.
There is no clear-cut rule for determining whether a particular reservation
will make a trust illusory. As the court declared in Newman v. Dore,
"We do not attempt now to formulate any general test of how far a set-
tlor must divest himself of his interest in the trust property to render the
conveyance more than illusory.' ' "s The approach is ad hoc, but the test
under this view of the illusory trust doctrine is solely one of the quantum
82 See note 29 su ra, and accompanying text.
83 If a husband, by creating a trust inter vivos and reserving the right to the income
during his lifetime and the power to revoke the trust at any time until he dies, can
deprive his widow of a share of the property, he is enabled to keep the benefits of
the property as long as he lives and yet to deprive her of any interest in it when he
dies. Nevertheless, the courts have held that the reservation by the husband of these
rights does not entitle the widow to treat the trust property as a part of her hus-
band's estate for the purpose of acquiring a distributive share thereof. It has been so
held not only where the husband conveys property to another person as trustee but
also where he declares himself trustee.
A.W. Scott, The Effect of a Power To Revoke a Trust, 57 HARv. L. REV. 362, 370 (1944).
14322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944).
aaSee also In re Pengelly's Estate, 374 Pa. 358, 97 A.2d 844, 846 (1953) which also takes this
view.
8
"A.W. Scott, The Effect of a Power To Revoke a Trust, 57 HARV. L. REV. 362, 370 (1944).
It will be recalled that this is the rule declared by the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 57(2)
(1935) as to what constitutes a testamentary transaction. And, Professor Scott's article was written
prior to the change in 1957. Under the Restatement view prior to that time the trust under dis-
cussion was testamentary-so whether or not it was illusory was of little import.
8379 N.E.2d at 969.
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of ownership retained. In addition to the guidelines developed by the
courts, two state legislatures have ventured into the area."8 In New York
the statute provides in part that the reservation of a power of revocation,
consumption, disposition, or invasion of the principal will render an ex-
press trust illusory.
The guidelines can be summarized as follows: In those jurisdictions
where the problem is determined by statute, a power of revocation, a power
of consumption of principal, or a power of appointment over the corpus
will render a trust invalid as to the surviving spouse. The courts, however,
have not been so willing to assert a protective mantle over the wife-
the power of revocation and some limited powers of invasion have been
upheld. The better view seems to be that any reservation of beneficial en-
joyment renders a trust illusory to the extent of that interest. a9 The anal-
ogy of the Internal Revenue Code is obvious."
The doctrine of illusory trusts has received other interpretations in many
other decisions.' In such decisions the major problem has been whether
"
8 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (1950); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 18(a) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1966).
" But see note 26 suPra.
4 5 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036.
41 Intent, or All Facts and Circumstances Test: The pure ownership rule or control test derived
from Newman v. Dore has certain disadvantages because it does not take into consideration the
other factors which may be significant in determining whether to emasculate a carefully considered
estate plan. Where, for example, a widow is amply provided for by other property, a rule of per se
invalidity may not be the most desirable, particularly if only small gifts in trust to justifiable re-
cipients are included. Because of this, the ownership test has been modified in some jurisdictions, in
one or another manner.
In order to avoid the harshness of the strict control test some jurisdictions employ a much
broader rule. The question asked is whether the transaction, as viewed from all the facts and cir-
cumstances, indicates a "real" transfer. When this test is used facts outside of the trust instrument
having nothing to do with retained control become apposite. In fact, what the courts are determin-
ing is the intention of the settlor-did he really intend to make a completed transfer? Under this
view all the facts must be looked to, not just the incidents of ownership. The incidents of owner-
ship are important, but are not controlling, and the retention of a small amount of power may
make the transfer illusory in some circumstances while the retention of a large amount may be
valid in others.
Speaking of the decision in Newman v. Dore, a New York court once declared, "While the
court excludes intention to defraud the widow as a criterion of invalidity of the trust, it does not
exclude such intention to defraud as a relevant circumstance to be taken into consideration in the
process of determining whether the transfer is 'real' or 'illusory.'" Murray v. Brooklyn Say. Bank,
169 Misc. 1014, 9 N.Y.S.2d 227, 233 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1939). Although this reading of Newman
v. Dore seems quite questionable, the possible intent of the settlor to deprive his wife has been one
extrinsic fact which the New York courts have thought relevant in determining trust validity. The
intention of the settlor to deprive his wife of her statutory rights is not considered to determine
whether there was fraud, but to determine whether the settlor "in good faith intended to divest
himself of his ownership of the property." Although the settlor's intent to deprive his widow of
a share of the property will not invalidate the trust in the absence of some retained power, such
an intent may be considered quite important. Clavin v. Clavin, 41 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (Sup. Ct.
1943); Burns v. Turnbull, 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1943), order clarified, 268 App.
Div. 822, 49 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945); Murray v.
Brooklyn Say. Bank, 169 Misc. 1014, 9 N.Y.S.2d 227, 233 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1939); Marine Mid-
land Trust Co. v. Stanford, 256 App. Div. 26, 9 N.Y.S.2d 648, 651 (1939). In one decision the
court in New York noted the absence of any evidence of an intent to deprive the wife of her
statutory share as an important element in upholding the trust. President & Directors of Manhattan
Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S.2d 375, 386 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
Another factor sometimes found significant in determining whether a trust is illusory is the
size of the trust estate in relation to the remainder of the decedent's property. 14 N.Y.S.2d at
385-86; Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, 256 App. Div. 26, 9 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1939) ("In
arriving at the intent, the equities between the spouses, as well as their settlements and acts, may
be considered.") If the remainder is large, the courts are more inclined to find the trust valid. In
addition, the objects of the bounty of the decedent are often significant-a mistress fares far worse
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circumstances other than retention of control should be allowed to affect
the validity of the trust."2 For example, is an intent on the part of the
settlor to deprive his wife of her statutory rights a factor to be consid-
than do children of the spouses.
Totten Trusts: Those jurisdictions which recognize the so-called Totten (from the case enun-
ciating their validity in New York, In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (Ct. App. 1904)),
or saving bank trust, are faced with an additional problem. The Totten trust represents the re-
servation of every power of ownership that can be retained by the settlor. Under a pure ownership
test these trusts are per se illusory. In re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951);
Murray v. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 169 Misc. 1014, 9 N.Y.S.2d 227, 234 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1939).
Three views have been advanced in dealing with this troublesome device under the illusory doctrine.
The first to be advanced was the Maryland view, an ad hoc balancing of the interests much like that
applied in the non-Totten trust situations after Newman. The strict "control" test was modified
to consider "all the facts and circumstances."
In Maryland Totten trusts are subject to the survivor's marital interest, but only where there
is some additional fact or circumstance which the court can point to as tipping the scales. For
example, in Mushaw v. Mushaw, 39 A.2d 465 (Md. Ct. App. 1944), the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals explained: "The salient fact is that the widow is completely stripped of her marital rights
in the personal property of her husband. This may be a matter of degree, but it appears to be the
only basis on which the decisions can be reconciled." Id. at 467-68. This view was followed for
a time by the lower courts in New York. As the court explained in Burns v. Turnbull, 266 App.
Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1943), order clarified, 268 App. Div. 822, 49 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1944),
aff'd, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945):
What evidence is required to establish that test [of Newman]? May the Plaintiff rest
upon the agreement and its consequences? In other words, should trusts of this kind
be rendered illegal because they remove property from the estate taking effect at
death? Is intent not to divest oneself of title to be presumed because the settlor
of the trust retained control of her property during her lifetime and because the
survivor's share was lessened by operation of the trust?
37 N.Y.S.2d at 385. That court concluded that "some evidence in addition to the trust agreement
and its legal consequences is necessary .... ." Id. at 387.
Then came the landmark decision of In re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (Ct.
App. 1951), aff'g 100 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Sup. Ct. 1950), which established the second rule for dealing
with these trusts. In that decision the New York Court of Appeals thoroughly disembowelled
Newman v. Dore, at least as it had been applied to Totten trusts. Halpern declares that a Totten
trust is not illusory unless it is testamentary, i.e., unless it is a mere agency as opposed to a trust.
In short, every Totten trust in New York is valid under the marital property doctrine unless it is
also invalid under some rule regulating general property transfers.
The third view of the illusory character of Totten trusts is that of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRusTs § 58 (1957). In essence the Restatement rule is that the widow will include the
amount of the Totten trust in calculating her statutory share, but other assets of the estate will
be exhausted to fulfill this statutory obligation before the trust assets will be used. It is based on
the rationale that (1) a Totten trust is valid; (2) it cannot deprive the widow of her statutory
share; (3) it does represent the desires of the decedent as to the disposition of his property.
In In re Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964), apparently the only deci-
sion to adopt the Restatement view, the Supreme Court of Minnesota noted this criticism of the
Maryland and Halpern views:
We are not satisfied that either the New York rule or Maryland rule should be adopt-
ed. While the Maryland rule is more equitable, it provides no clear standard of appli-
cation. Under both the New York and Maryland rules, the trust is either good against
the spouse or void altogether. We would prefer the Restatement rule, by which the
beneficiaries receive what the decedent intended them to have except so far as the
trust funds are necessary to satisfy the statutory interest of the spouse after the
general assets of the estate have been exhausted.
130 N.W.2d at 481.
" In addition to these tests another has been paid lip service, but in fact never adopted. It
might be termed a "net effect" test. The effect concerned with here is the economic effect of the
transfer on the wife-does it have the effect of depriving her of a statutory share of the husband's
property? Although not applying a strict net effect test, Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St.
195, 58 N.E.2d 381, 391 (1944), set forth the result test in clear terms: "[I]rrespective of the
husband's intention, if the device resorted to is such as to cut down or deprive the widow of [her
statutory rights] such device is voidable when challenged by the widow." The court held the trust
"illusory," and defined the term thusly: "The term 'illusory' . . . is intended to show that such
trusts may not be used as a device to deprive the widow of her distributive share of the property
possessed by her husband at the time of his death." 58 N.E.2d at 390. Another statement of the
rule is found in Clavin v. Clavin, 41 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1943), although again the de-
cision was probably not predicated upon such rationale: "[A] man may not, while married, make
an illusory transfer having the effect in form to divest his wife of her inheritance."
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ered in determining whether a trust is illusory? " Is it relevant that a large
estate remains outside of the trust and subject to her statutory interest?"4
In setting aside transactions as illusory the courts have used several dif-
ferent standards for determining invalidity but only rarely has there been
an attempt to distinguish among them. In what appears to be the original
doctrine of Newman v. Dore, the courts look solely to the transfer in-
strument to determine the amount of retained control, and from that fact
alone decide whether a trust is illusory as to a surviving spouse." The
Newman court found that an intent of the settlor to injure his spouse was
totally irrelevant to the decision. Intent was declared relevant only in a
fraud situation, and in Newman there was no question of fraud because
the wife, during her husband's lifetime, could not be defrauded of an in-
terest which she did not then possess in his property. The test is one of
control--does the settlor retain the indicia of ownership? If he does, then
the widow is entitled to a share of the property irrespective of ownership
for purposes of probate jurisdiction, because it was controlled by the
decedent until his death.
Although the Newman court specifically rejected the intent of the
settlor as a relevant circumstance in determining the validity of a trust,
the language of intent has been used in later cases to illustrate this doc-
trine, and such language often only clouds the issue. For example, in Mac-
Gregor v. Fox* a New York court determined that a trust was illusory
solely from the fact that the settlor retained the power to revoke plus the
power to invade principal. The language of the court is illustrative. In-
stead of saying that the reservation of these powers indicated that the
settlor did not part with sufficient control over her property, the court
pointed to these incidents of ownership as facts which "indicated that she
intended the agreement to be testamentary in character, effective only
upon her death. ' "?
It is submitted that the incidents of ownership can always be pointed
to as indicative of such an intent, but that the intent is really not the rele-
vant factor. The retention of control is itself the relevant circumstance,
not some intent which can always be inferred from the instrument.
s"[lI]f his intent is to use an illusory transfer as a means to retain the property but to divest
his wife of a share in it, then such intent becomes part of a wrongful fraud." Clavin v. Clavin,
41 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
44 Cf. President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S.2d 375
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
41 In Newman the court explained that:
Motive or intent is an unsatisfactory test of the validity of a transfer of property.
In most jurisdictions it has been rejected, sometimes for the reason that it would cast
doubt upon the validity of all transfers made by a married man outside of the regular
course of business; sometimes because it is difficult to find a satisfactory logical foun-
dation for it. Intent may, at times, be relevant in determining whether an act is
fraudulent, but there can be no fraud where no right of any person in invaded. ...
Since the law gives the wife only an expectant interest in the property of her hus-
band which becomes part of his estate, and since the law does not restrict transfers
of property by the husband during his life, it would seem that the only sound test of
the validity of a challenged transfer is whether it is real or illusory.
9 N.E.2d at 968-69.




Conclusion. The complications associated with the doctrine of illusory
trusts are enormous. Its independence from other trust doctrines is con-
fused and frequently denied. Its standards are shifting and elusive and
many times nonexistent. Nevertheless, the doctrine has much to offer, and
the Texas Supreme Court has recently held that it is applicable in this
state. The problems associated with the doctrine itself will occupy the
courts for some time, and in Texas an additional problem is created by
superimposing what is essentially a common law doctrine on a community
property system.
III. THE TEXAS DOCTRINE OF ILLUSORY TRUSTS
Land v. Marshall" is a Texas marital property trust case-the first case
in any community property jurisdiction to adopt the doctrine of illusory
trusts.4" In Land the settlor created a revocable inter vivos trust, funded
with community property, in which he named himself, and thereafter his
wife, as lifetime beneficiaries, with remainders over to their grandchil-
dren." He retained extensive management power over the trust: to vote
trust stock, to invade principal, to require sale, encumbrance, or pur-
chase of assets. The settlor's spouse, who did not join in the transaction,
brought suit after his death, alleging that the trust was a fraud on her
community interest and an illusory transfer. The supreme court, relying
heavily on Neivinan v. Dore," held that the case was governed by the doc-
trine of illusory trusts. Under this rationale"2 the court declared the trust
invalid as to the wife's community interest.
In community property jurisdictionsa the husband has extensive pow-
ers of management, control, and disposition over the community estate
during the existence of the marriage. 4 In Texas this power is specified in
the newly enacted article 4621, which reads as follows:
45426 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1968).
4 Heretofore the doctrine applied to protect the spouse's interest has been to determine whether
there was actual or constructive fraud on her rights. See note 60 infra. The doctrine of testamen-
tary-agency transactions has been applied in community property jurisdictions. E.g., Nichols v.
Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 41 P. 1089 (1895) (beneficial enjoyment plus control held testamentary);
Chaison v. Chaison, 154 S.W.2d 961 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (trust with reservation of beneficial
enjoyment for period of fifteen years held "agency"). The Chaison decision seems to have been
severely limited by the decision of Schmidt v. Schmidt, 261 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953),
error ref. (reservation of life estate does not render a trust testamentary).
" This provision was somewhat modified during the lifetime of the settlor. A more complete
statement of the facts can be found in the opinion of the lower court. Marshall v. Land, 413
S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
5' 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
"This trust might also have been subject to the objection that it was an agency. See note 15
supra. The supreme court, however, effectively avoided ever reaching that question. Declaring that
this trust, with one-half of the principal now removed, would not effectuate the intent of the
decedent, the court declared that portion invalid also. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
" The concept of community property is essentially Germanic (Visigothic) in origin, although
the women of Athens are said to have had similar rights and privileges. R. BALLINGER, COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY 6 (1895). Transported to Spain during the early part of the fifth century, the
concept of marital partnership was first codified in the Fuero Juzgo of 693. See generally G.
SCHMIDT, LAWS OF SPAIN AND MEXICO 28 (1851). A compilation of Spanish statutes relating to
community property may be found in L. ROBBINS, COMMUNITY LAWS WITH TRANSLATIONS OF
THE COMMENTARIES THEREON OF MATIENZO, AZEVEDO, GUTTIEREZ 7-8 (1940). See also W.
DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1943).
24See, e.g., The pre-1913 Texas rule, note 55 infra.
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During marriage each spouse shall have sole management, control and dis-
position of that community property which he or she would have owned if
a single person, including (but not limited to) his or her personal earnings,
the revenues from his or her separate property, the recoveries for personal
injuries awarded to him or her, and the increase, mutations and revenues of
all property subject to his or her sole management, control and disposition;
... if community property subject to the sole management, control and dis-
position of one spouse is mixed or combined with community property sub-
ject to the sole management, control and disposition of the other spouse, the
mixed or combined community property is subject to the joint management,
control and disposition of the spouses unless the spouses provide otherwise;
any other community property is subject to the joint management, control
and disposition of the husband and wife.'
5 In the Sixtieth Legislature (1967) extensive revision was made by the passage of S.B. 33,
which amended, repealed or replaced, among others, arts. 4610-4627, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
The bill became effective January 1, 1968. Tex. Laws 1968, ch. 309, § 1, at 735. This provision
represents a significant change in the powers of management, control and distribution conferred
on the husband. Prior to these enactments the husband had extensive powers of management, con-
trol and disposition of all of the community property.
In 1840 the Texas Congress provided by statute that Spanish matrimonial property law should
remain in effect in this state:
Sec. 3: Be it further enacted, That neither the lands nor slaves which the wife
may own, or to which she may have any right, title or claim at the time of her
marriage, nor the land nor slaves to which she may acquire, during the coverture,
any right, title, or claim, by gift, devise or descent, nor the increase of such slaves
in each case, nor the paraphernalia as defined at Common Law, which the wife may
have at the time of the marriage, or which she may acquire during the coverture
as aforesaid, shall, by virtue of the marriage, become the property of the husband,
but shall remain the separate property of the wife; Provided, however, That during
the continuance of the marriage, the husband shall have the sole management of such
lands and slaves.
Sec. 4. Be it further enacted, That all property which the husband or wife may
bring into the marriage except land and slaves and the wife's paraphernalia and
all the property acquired during the marriage, except such land or slaves, or their
increase, as may be acquired by either party, by gift, devise or descent, and except
also the wife's paraphernalia, acquired as aforesaid, and during the time aforesaid,
shall be the common property of the husband and wife, and during the coverture
may be sold or otherwise disposed of by the husband only.
2 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 178 (1840).
In 1913 the legislature conferred on the wife the power to manage, control, and dispose of her
separate property, and that portion of the community which derived from her separate property
or from her personal earnings. H.B. 22 as enacted provided:
Art. 4621 ..... .During marriage the husband shall have the sole management,
control and disposition of his separate property, both real and personal, and the wife
shall have the sole management, control and disposition of her separate property,
both real and personal; provided, however, the joinder of the husband in the manner
now provided by law for conveyance of the separate real estate of the wife shall
be necessary to an encumbrance or conveyance by the wife of her lands. ...
Art. 4622. All property acquired by either the husband or wife during marriage,
except that which is the separate property of either one or the other, shall be deemed
the common property of the husband and wife, and during coverture may be disposed
of by the husband only, provided, however, the personal earnings of the wife,
the rents from the wife's real estate, the interest of bonds and notes belonging to her
and dividends on stocks owned by her shall be under the control, management and
disposition of the wife alone. ...
Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 32, § 1, at 61.
In 1925 the provision giving the wife management over her personal earnings, the rents from
the wife's real estate, the interest on bonds and notes belonging to her and dividends on stocks owned
by her was omitted from the statute.
However, the omission was given no significance in Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 228
S.W.2d 837 (1950) which gave additional definition to the wife's power over the mutations of the
wife's separate property. But cf. Strickland v. Wester, 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (1938);
Hawkins v. Britton State Bank, 122 Tex. 69, 52 S.W.2d 243 (1932).
Former art. 4619, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., provided: "All property acquired by either the
husband or wife during marriage, except that which is the separate property of either, shall be
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Under the new statute the husband possesses vast powers of management
over the community because in the normal situation the great majority
of the community property will be that which the husband earns. In ad-
dition, that part of the community subject to the wife's powers of man-
agement now presents her with the opportunity to deprive the husband
of his share. The rules relating to the husband's managerial power, which
were developed under previous statutes, apparently will apply with equal
force to the wife's power to manage her portion of the community.
When interpreting the husband's managerial power, the Texas courts
have often declared that he occupies a fiduciary position.' But his mana-
gerial powers are described in strong terms: "as he sees fit,". 7 "final and
conclusive,"" and "absolute.""9 Because of his power to manage the com-
munity property, the husband through inter vivos transfer is able to ef-
fectively deprive the wife of property which she owns and which other-
wise would become subject to her exclusive management at his death. This
is much like the power of the husband in a common law jurisdiction to
deprive his wife of her statutory share.
In community property jurisdictions, and in many common law juris-
dictions, the marital property concept used to prevent such action is the
doctrine of fraud.Y0 This doctrine was expressly rejected in Newman v.
deemed the common property of the husband and wife . . . .During coverture the common prop-
erty of the husband and wife may be disposed of by the husband only ....
" Scott v. Scott, 170 S.W. 273, 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
57Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 359 S.W.2d 48, 50 (1962).
5 Coleman v. Coleman, 293 S.W. 695, 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
5 9 Lindly v. Lindly, 109 S.W. 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908). See also Moody v. Smoot, 78 Tex.
119, 14 S.W. 285, 286 (1890) ("Barring any disposition made with intent to defraud her, he may
sell, barter, or give it away."); Shaw v. Shaw, 28 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (hus-
band had "the sole right to dispose of the community property"); Dallas Plumbing Co. v. Har-
rington, 275 S.W. 190, 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (husband "alone authorized to contract com-
munity debts and dispose of community property"); Lindly v. Lindly, 109 S.W. 467, 469 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1908) ("he may sell it and squander the proceeds"); 1 0. SPEER, MARITAL RIGHTS IN
TEXAS 302-03 (Oakes 4th ed. 1961).
'0 Prior to the decision in Land v. Marshall the wife in Texas had to prove acts of actual or
constructive fraud in order to set aside inter vivos disposition by the husband. Moore v. Moore, 73
Tex. 382, 11 S.W. 396 (1889); Millican v. Millican, 24 Tex. 426 (1859); Stramler v. Coe, 15
Tex. 211 (1855); Wright v. Hayes, 10 Tex. 130 (1853); Martin v. Moran, 32 S.W. 904 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1895); Smitheal v. Smith, 31 S.W. 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) (reversing on other
grounds). In Texas this means that under a fraud view she may have set aside those acts that are
"unreasonable," Brown v. Brown, 282 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), or "excessive," id., "done
without any just cause," Coss v. Coss, 207 S.W. 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), "with the fraudulent
view of injuring her rights," Moore v. Moore, 73 Tex. 382, 11 S.W. 396 (1889).
Fraud, actual or constructive, is probably the most widely accepted rationale for rendering
nugatory a trust which invades the wife's marital rights. Like the doctrine of illusory trusts,
fraud in this context is a marital property doctrine. The most significant element in determining
if the husband's act amounts to fraud is intent-"a desire to injure or defraud" the wife. Jones
v. Jones, 146 S.W. 265, 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). Intent is to be inferred from the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. The test, as applied, is basically subjective-but there are
some guides. Among the proposed statutory revisions in 1967 was a proposal to insert a legislative
standard, "and is not in discharge of a legal, moral or civic obligation." This proposal was not
enacted in the general recodification scheme. Such an enactment would have been far more objec-
tive than the test now applied. See generally McKnight, Recodification of Matrimonial Property
Law, 29 TEXAS B.J. 1000, 1046 (1966). The cases, and the standards, have varied somewhat as
the statutes have changed. For this reason the earlier cases, such as Hagerty v. Harwell, 16 Tex.
663 (1856), which deal with the pre-1913 statute, tend to contain language which is more strict
than the recent cases.
One of the most significant facts is the size of the gift in relation to the total community
estate. In Hagerty v. Harwell, supra, the court found that a gift of $750 from a total community
of $30,000 and separate property of over $20,000 "rebuts the possibility" of misdealing on the
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Dore,1 but many of the cases which purport to follow Newman actually
adopt an approach closer to the fraud cases, and look to intent as the
standard rather than the amount of control which is retained. If some doc-
trine other than the strict control test of Newman is applied, the illusory
trust doctrine becomes a method for judicial balancing of the equities be-
tween the spouses on an ad hoc basis." The fraud test is similar. For ex-
ample, in Burns v. Turnbull,"s a New York illusory trust case, the court
part of the husband. 16 Tex. at 666. In Brown v. Brown, 282 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955), gifts of life insurance premiums totaling almost $35,000 were held not to be "excessive,
fraudulent, or capricious" where the community estate totaled $250,000. Where, however, a
transaction involves substantially all of the community estate, the courts readily find the ex-
istence of actual fraud. Gutheridge v. Gutheridge, 161 S.W. 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (gift of
one-half of total community constitutes fraud). The case of Aaron v. Aaron, 137 S.W.2d 310
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943) presents an interesting fact situation, but cannot be cited as controlling
because of the treatment of life insurance policies by the Texas courts at that time. Here a jury
finding of fraud was upheld where the beneficiary on life insurance policies totalling $14,447.69
was changed, when the remainder of the community was $500 plus personal property. The in-
surance policies in question were originally the separate property of the husband. The jury found
that he made a gift thereof to the community by making his wife beneficiary and by using com-
munity funds to pay the premiums. Thereafter, the act of changing the beneficiary to his mother
was held to be fraud on his wife.
The Kentucky decision of Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W.2d 2 (1930) indicates a
similar view. "The rule in this state is that, while the wife cannot complain of reasonable gifts
or advancements by a husband to his children by a former marriage, yet, if the gifts constitute
the principal part of the husband's estate and be made without the wife's knowledge, a presumption
of fraud arises . 33 S.W.2d at 3. See also Harrison v. Harrison, 198 Ark. 64, 127 S.W.2d
270 (1939).
A related factual circumstance bearing on intent is whether or not the object of the gift is a
reasonable one. Where children or parents of one spouse are the object, which is the typical case,
an intent to defraud is not inferred as easily as where the object is some unrelated third party,
especially a paramour. As the court remarked with obvious disapproval in Coss v. Coss, 207 S.W.
127, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), "He deliberately entered into a state of adultery ....... See
Krueger v. Williams, 359 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1962); Dunn v. Vinyard, 234 S.W. 99 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921). But cf. Krenz v. Strohmeir, 177 S.W. 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (father and son collu-
sion held fraud on wife). Contra, Marquis v. Marquis, 178 Misc. 702, 35 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sup. Ct.
1942) (no relief although there was a paramour). Even where the funds are appropriated to his
own use, the courts often find no fraud. Cf. Martin v. McAlister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.W. 624
(1901). See also Moore v. Moore, 73 Tex. 382, 11 S.W. 396 (1889); Locke v. Locke, 143 S.W.2d
637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). A.W. Scott, Jr., The Revocable Trust and the Surviving Spouse's
Statutory Share in Colorado, 36 CoLO. L. REV. 464, 470 (1964) states "the widow is more apt to
win if her husband creates the trust for the benefit of his mistress, than if he does so in favor of
his children."
Another related factor in determining fraud is the existence of strained relations between the
spouses. Such facts as intent to abandon, harsh words, the existence of a mistress, and pending
divorce proceedings are significant as bearing on the intent of the husband.
6l Supra note 45. Conversely, the Missouri Supreme Court compared the doctrine of Newman
v. Dore with the concept of fraud, and determined to reject the former in favor of the latter.
Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 611, 618 (1939):
Appellant insists that by the weight of authority the test applied is essentially a
test of whether the husband has in good faith divested himself of the ownership
of the property. . . . Appellant cites: Newman v. Dore. . . . Appellant would have
us hold . . . that the husband may make a voluntary disposition of his personalty
during his life even with intent to deprive his wife of dower. . . . The general rule
of law (long in effect in this state) is that a conveyance of property by the husband
without consideration and with the intent and purpose to defeat his widow's marital
rights in his property, is a fraud upon such widow, and she may sue in her own
right, and set aside such fraudulent conveyance. . . . We adhere to the rule as
applied by this court.
62 Maryland is one of the few states to admit that this is what is in fact occurring. See note 41
supra. See also Burnet v. First Nat'l Bank, 12 Ill. App. 2d 514, 140 N.E.2d 362 (1957) (widow
"estopped" to challenge trust because she was lifetime beneficiary).
6337 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945). Compare
Reiss v. Reiss, 166 Misc. 274, 2 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (husband's action, with intent to
defeat widow's rights, held "fraud").
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held that intense dislike of the wife was a sufficient factor to justify setting
a trust aside. Although the court said that the test was the intent of the
settlor to divest himself of ownership, it held the trust to be illusory. Pat-
terson v. Patterson,' a Kentucky fraud case, held that the fact that the
decedent had an intense hatred for the widow did not constitute proof that
a gift was made with the intent to defraud. Yet the factor of hatred seems
significant only in determining whether the surviving spouse had been
treated inequitably.
In Land v. Marshall the court indicated the distinction to be applied in
Texas: "In our opinion fraud may be a basis for invalidating a trust;
however, the failure of an illusory trust need not rest upon proof of an
intent to defraud the wife . . . ."" The court set forth the following test
for determining illusory transfers: " 'Did the decedent, by the conveyance
in his lifetime, retain such a large interest in the property that, at least as
to his wife, his inter vivos trust was illusory?' "" The court cited the early
Texas decision of Crain v. Crain," involving the Texas forced heirship
statute. Crain apparently set out a control test:
[I]t is apparent that though under the excellent law or custom of England
an owner of personal property had the unlimited power of disposition by
donation during his life, provided he entirely divested himself of the property,
delivering it up, with the securities of title, to the donee, and the latter went
into the actual possession, enjoyment and control during the life of the donor,
receiving the rents and profits for his own benefit, yet, if the donor was not
divested in fact, but retained the securities or property in his possession, en-
joyment or control, and if the property did not in fact or substance, what-
ever may be the form, vest in the donee during the life of the parent, but
only after his death, such donation was void as in fraud of the custom . . .
the analogy between the custom and our statute is perfect."
The language in Land, taken with the court's reliance on Crain, indi-
cates that the Texas Supreme Court adopted the strict control test-that
the illusory character of the trust is to be determined from the incidents
of control reserved by the settlor, and not from other surrounding facts
and circumstances.
The result is that a deprived spouse in Texas now seemingly has two
remedies-the older fraud doctrine and the new untested illusory trust
doctrine with a strict control test. Any other view would mean that the
fraud test was redefined in a new and confusing form.
The Test of Control. If Texas has adopted the control test, what elements
will be sufficient to make a trust illusory? While a definitive answer must
await future decisions of the court, some guidelines are available. In Land
v. Marshall the supreme court expressly declared that the standards for
6424 S.W. 880 (Ky. Ct. App. 1894).
e5426 S.W.2d at 846.
66 i.
67 17 Tex. 81 (1856). See also Epperson v. Mills, 19 Tex. 66 (1857).68 17 Tex. at 97. See generally Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship; Its Sources in
Texas and Louisiana, 4 LA. L. REs. 42 (1941). The "custom" described by the court is the custom
of dividing a decedent's property into three parts, one share for the wife, one for the children,
and one for the decedent to dispose of as he desired. See also C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES
O THE COMMON LAW 30 (1949).
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determining whether a trust is illusory are not the same as the standards
for determining whether it is an agency. Noting that the argument of the
proponents of the trust was predicated upon cases determining "whether
the trustor retained such dominion over the trust property and control
of the trustee as to constitute an agency rather than a trust,"6 the court
rejected this line of cases as controlling: "In the present case, we deal with
a problem created by our community property protection of the wife's
distributive share, a factor not present in the cases defendants rely upon.
The scheme of our community property law brings additional policy con-
siderations to bear." 7
The Effect of Being Termed "Illusory." When a trust is declared illusory,
the effect is to render it invalid as to the wife's community interest in the
property. An interesting twist was added by Land v. Marshall: The court
also declared the trust invalid as to the husband's community property
because with one-half of the corpus gone, the trust would no longer ef-
69 426 S.W.2d at 848.
7 The guidelines for determining whether a trust is testamentary may, however, be significant
because they represent the outer limit on retention of power. The view of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 57(1) (1957), cited in Land v. Marshall, is the majority view of what consti-
tutes a testamentary transfer:
Where an interest in the trust property is created in a beneficiary other than the
settlor, the disposition is not testamentary and invalid for failure to comply with
the Statute of Wills merely because the settlor reserves a beneficial life interest
or because he reserves in addition a power to revoke the trust in whole or in part,
and a power to modify the trust, and a power to control the trustee as to the ad-
ministration of the trust.
But compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 57(2) (1935). And see Ambrosius v. Am-
brosius, 239 F. 473 (2d Cir. 1917) (intent of decedent to pass only interest at death); Atlantic
Nat'l Bank v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 357 Mo. 770, 211 S.W.2d 2 (1948) (no trust); Tun-
nell's Estate, 325 Pa. 554, 190 A. 906 (1937) (self-declaration of trust with reserved life estate
and power of control held invalid). Nevertheless, the majority rule is clearly that of the Restate-
ment. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 286 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1961); Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal.
323, 41 P. 1089 (1895); In re Morrison's Estate, 189 Kan. 704, 371 P.2d 171 (1962); Ridge v.
Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d 607 (1956); Smith v. Deshaw, 116 Vt. 441, 78 A.2d 479 (1951).
See also A.W. Scott, The Effects of a Power To Revoke a Trust, 57 HARv. L. REV. 362, 368
(1944); A.W. Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills, 43 HARV. L. Rv. 521, 527-40 (1930).
Moreover, prior Texas decisions adopt a relatively more stringent view of what constitutes a
testamentary trust. For example, the reservation of income for a term of years plus the power to
revoke was held in one case to make a trust testamentary. Chaison v. Chaison, 154 S.W.2d 961
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941). But considerable doubt is cast on that holding by the decision in Schmidt
v. Schmidt, 261 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), error ref. It is reasonable to assume that
any reservation sufficient to invalidate the trust on an agency theory would clearly be sufficient
to make the trust illusory. The agency problem can be avoided by having all trust instruments
wherein the grantor reserves beneficial enjoyment plus the power to revoke executed with the
formalities for wills. But this will not prevent a trust from being declared invalid as illusory.
In addition, the standards for determining whether a trust is illusory are not those used in
determining whether an outright inter vivos gift is valid. There is a clear distinction between trust
law and the law relating to inter vivos gifts. The court in Land noted "the clear conceptual differ-
ences between an inter vivos trust and an inter vivos gift." 426 S.W.2d at 845. The validity of
an alleged gift inter vivos is to be determined in Texas by whether the donor intended to presently
divest himself of control and dominion over the subject-matter of the gift. See generally Fleck
v. Baldwin, 141 Tex. 340, 172 S.W.2d 975, 978 (1943), and cases cited therein.
Texas courts have been quite strict in the application of this standard, and have not looked
with favor on inter vivos gifts. The courts often refer to such transactions as "testamentary,"
but the distinction between an inter vivos trust and an inter vivos gift is significant, and the
standards for the former are much less demanding than those for the latter. In common law
jurisdictions the illusory doctrine has not been confined to transfers in trust. Instead, outright
transfers of beneficial enjoyment, to take effect in the future, transfers creating joint tenancies,
and similar transactions have been declared subject to the doctrine and judged by the same stand-
ards. In Texas, presumably, the stricter standards will continue to apply to inter vivos gifts.
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fectuate the intention of the settlor.7' This result is justified in light of the
fact that the trust was in large measure emasculated by the decision. It is
arguable that a trust will never be able to effectuate the intent of the
settlor after the wife withdraws one-half of the corpus. Therefore, such a
fate for the remaining one-half of the trust property is not unforeseeable.
An illusory trust is not void; it is voidable only at the election of the
surviving spouse."2 Thus the doctrine of the "widow's election" provides
a significant analogy because the will in that situation is not void, but only
voidable. Under the widow's election doctrine the survivor who elects to
take back her own property disposed of in the will in lieu of taking under
a will is not entitled to the benefits of the latter. 3 It seems clear that as to
the remaining trust property this rule should be applied-the widow
should not be entitled to take back her portion of the corpus and still take
as a beneficiary of the trust. However, this raises a significant question.
If the deceased settlor leaves a will in addition to the trust, is the widow
entitled to contest the trust as to her community property and also take a
specific bequest under the will? It seems that an election against the trust
should be considered an election against the will although it is by no means
clear. If the will incorporates the trust by reference this problem should be
avoided; in this situation, an election against the trust should be clearly
an election against the will.
If there is no will, the wife is ordinarily entitled to an intestate share
of her husband's estate. 4 Yet the question remains: Can she take back her
share of the community from the trust and still take by intestacy? The
widow's election cases indicate that she cannot elect against the will and
still take an intestate share of property not included in the will. 5 By an-
alogy the same result should obtain when she contests a trust.
If the surviving spouse elects against the trust, and the entire trust is
held invalid, she may thereafter be able to withdraw her share of the com-
munity from the trust and take a share of the remainder of the invalid
trust by intestacy unless the doctrine of the widow's election is applied. It
seems that the rule should be that when the surviving spouse challenges
a trust as illusory, an election has been made. If there is a will, both the
will and the trust should be considered together as a single instrument. An
election against one should be an election against both. If there is no will,
the election against the trust should be considered as though it were an
election against a will, and the body of precedent applicable to the widow's
election should be equally applicable to the illusory trust situation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Texas doctrine of illusory trusts is circumscribed by an uncharted
periphery. In the opinion of the author the following rules provide a
framework for avoiding its pitfalls: (1) the doctrine is predicated upon
" 426 S.W.2d at 847.
72 See note 28 supra.
72 See Comment, The Widow's Election-A Study in Three Parts, 15 Sw. L.J. 85, 96 (1961).
"
4 TFx. PRoB. CoDE ANN. §§ 38, 45 (1956).
72 See Comment, supra note 73. Note, however, that there is no Texas holding directly on point.
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a standard of control; (2) the doctrine must be distinguished from the
agency and from the colorable transactions; (3) the doctrine will prob-
ably not invalidate a revocable trust unless some measure of beneficial
enjoyment is retained; (4) the doctrine of the widow's election should
provide a sufficient analogy.
The draftsman should take the following steps to avoid having a trust
declared illusory: (1) both spouses should, if possible, join in the creation
of the trust; (2) the provisions of the trust should be carefully explained
to both; (3) the trust should be altered, amended, or revoked only by the
spouses acting jointly." A recent article suggests that the draftsman "give
the wife the right to elect to withdraw her one-half of the community
property upon the death of the husband."" It is submitted that such a
provision is tantamount to an admission that a given trust is illusory, and
it is suggested that such a provision not be included.
76 Brorby, Pitfalls in Drafting the Revocable Trust in Texas, 31 TEXAS B.J. 479, 565 (1968).
77 Id.
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